Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

International Law Studies - Volume 86
The War in Iraq: A Legal Analysis
Raul A. “Pete” Pedrozo (Editor)

VI
The International Humanitarian Law
Classification of Armed Conflicts in Iraq
since 2003

David Turns*
Introduction: Review of the Timeline of Events in Iraq

A

n armed conflict, within the meaning of international humanitarian law
(IHL), began in Iraq when that country was invaded by military forces of
the coalition composed primarily of the United States, the United Kingdom and
Australia in March 2003. It continues to this day, notwithstanding a certain decline
in intensity since the British withdrawal in July 2009 and the reorganization of US
forces under a new security agreement with the Iraqi government in December of
the same year. Over the course of its duration, the Iraq conflict has undergone
three definite mutations in terms of its participants, mutations which have had the
effect of altering its characterization under IHL. The four phases of the conflict
have been as follows:
1. the initial invasion, which saw hostilities between the coalition forces
and those of the Iraqi government of President Saddam Hussein (March
to April 2003);
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International Humanitarian Law Classification of Armed Conflicts in Iraq
2. the debellatio of Iraq and its belligerent occupation by the victors,
represented by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), confronted
by an increasingly violent insurgency (April 2003 to June 2004);
3. the transformation of the coalition occupying forces, with broader
international participation and a United Nations mandate, but still
opposed by the insurgency, into the Multinational Force–Iraq (MNF-I)
(June 2004 to December 2008); and
4. the continuing presence of US forces (all others having withdrawn) to
help confront the insurgency, without a UN mandate but with a security
agreement negotiated between the United States and the Iraqi government (since January 2009).
The question of the nature of the armed conflict in Iraq is not of merely academic interest, nor can it be dismissed as an exercise in sterile semantics of no practical importance to the troops on the ground. On the contrary, the determination
of the nature of an armed conflict in the sense of IHL has a very real significance for
the military forces engaged in the conflict, for it impacts directly such practical military activities as the status of the participants, their consequent classification and
treatment after capture by an opposing party, the conduct of hostilities and the use
of weaponry. Above all, it determines the international law framework and rules
applicable to the situation.
IHL recognizes two basic types of armed conflict: international (IAC) and noninternational (NIAC). Although, broadly speaking, many of the same principles of
customary international law are now considered applicable in both types of conflict,1 the fact remains that the detailed legal regulation of conduct in armed conflicts is still contained primarily in the various treaties that have accumulated over
the last one hundred fifty years—principally the Hague Regulations of 1907, the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their Additional Protocols of 1977. The scope of
application of each of these instruments is precisely defined, but they were designed for conflicts that were comparatively clear in nature: one State against another State or a State against insurgents, that is, its own nationals in its own
territory. A salient feature of the hostilities in Iraq from an Anglo-American perspective, after the CPA was wound down in June 2004 and the coalition occupying
forces became a multinational force present with a mandate from the UN Security
Council and the consent of the new Iraqi government, has been the fact of State
forces being engaged in foreign territory against foreign non-State actors. This situation, not having been expressly envisaged in 1907, 1949 or 1977, is not covered as
98
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such in the relevant treaties and its legal characterization remains a matter of some
uncertainty.2 The United States and the United Kingdom, the two principal MNF-I
partners in Iraq, did not agree on the legal characterization of the conflict in that
country: the United Kingdom considered it to be de facto non-international, while
the United States, intellectually hobbled by the Bush administration’s insistence on
viewing the use of force through the prism of the so-called Global War on Terror,3
vacillated between the two paradigms of armed conflict. They cannot both have
been correct, at least not simultaneously. The controversy surrounding the classification of the armed conflict in Iraq after the belligerent occupation phase was over,
and the tendency of governments to rely on their own assessments of such classification—which are usually determined on the basis of the government’s own concerns, e.g., its unwillingness to contemplate questions surrounding the status of
captured “terrorists” under IHL—rather than on the basis of objective legal considerations, is understandable but unfortunate: firstly from the perspective of the
troops in theater, and secondly from the judicial perspective. As to the latter, a British asylum and immigration tribunal has stated (in a case concerning the existence
of an armed conflict in Iraq for the purposes of determining whether an Iraqi
refugee qualified for admission to the United Kingdom as an asylum seeker):
[T]he reasons [the immigration judge at first instance] gave for finding that Iraq was
not in a state of internal armed conflict were misconceived. It was wrong to view it as a
matter settled by the (assumed) fact that the United Kingdom government has not
accepted Iraq is in such a state. It is a matter to be judicially determined by applying legal
criteria to the factual situation in that country.4

Therefore, this article considers the characterization of the armed conflict in
Iraq under IHL in each of the four stages enumerated above. While the characterization of the conflict as an IAC in its early stages (invasion through occupation)
was clear enough, after the end of occupation it could not have been an IAC on a
plain reading of the scope of application provisions of the Geneva Conventions,
but nor could it have been a NIAC by the same terms or by any application of logic.
The British determination, however reticent in its expression, that it was a NIAC
was a policy decision based on a mixture of expediency and a literalist interpretation of the Geneva Conventions, but its accuracy as a matter of legal doctrine—to
say nothing of its desirability—is in this author’s opinion highly questionable in
light of the aims and objectives of the humanitarian treaties that form the kernel of
the contemporary law of armed conflict (LOAC). Since the law applicable in situations of NIAC is minimalist, vague and general in nature by comparison with that
applicable in IAC, and the humanitarian aims and objectives of the law indicate
99
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that the greatest possible protection should be afforded to victims in armed conflicts, it is suggested that it would have been better to have treated the conflict in
Iraq post-2004 as de facto international in nature; such an approach would also arguably have been better for the MNF-I soldiers on the ground, as it would simultaneously have provided them with greater explicit freedom of action and legal
protection under the LOAC. As a preliminary to this discussion, however, it is necessary first to recall the typology of armed conflicts in international humanitarian
law, for it is the law’s scope of application—the determination of the existence of
different types of conflict—that determines its substantive content.
Review of the Scope of Application of IHL
Armed Conflicts
The spectrum of conflict in international law is classically said to comprise several
stages of increasing intensity, from the violent (but legally non-conflict) stage of
riots, disturbances and tensions through to full-blown international armed conflict, but it would be helpful first to consider as a starting question: what is an
armed conflict, generically, in international law? Strangely enough for such a detailed specialist area of the law, there is no answer to this question in the treaty texts
that dominate the lex lata. Of the principal treaty instruments that comprise the
majority of contemporary IHL, the Hague Regulations do not specify a notion of
armed conflict in the modern sense, referring merely to their applicability to “war”
and “belligerents [who] are parties to the Convention”;5 the Geneva Conventions
and their Additional Protocols do specify the types of conflicts to which they apply,
but without actually defining those types of conflict generically. The authoritative
International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Commentary to the Geneva
Conventions attempted to cast the net as wide as possible, asserting that “[a]ny difference arising between two States and leading to the intervention of armed forces
is an armed conflict,”6 but this position is not supported by State practice7 and, in
any event, in its State-centric approach, is of relatively limited use for contemporary conflicts, the vast majority of which are not between States. The conflict in Iraq
after the defeat of Saddam’s regime in April 2003 is a case in point.
It has thus been left to customary international law, through the mechanism of a
judicial decision, to come up with a definition. In the Tadic case before the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), the defendant argued,
inter alia, that there had been no armed conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the
time when he had committed the acts with which he was charged, and that therefore they could not have constituted criminal violations of IHL, because, absent an
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armed conflict, that body of law was not applicable to the situation. The ICTY
Appeals Chamber held that
an armed conflict exists whenever there is a resort to armed force between States or
protracted armed violence between governmental authorities and organized armed
groups or between such groups within a State. International humanitarian law applies
from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of
hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal
conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international
humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring States or, in
the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, whether
or not actual combat takes place there.8

Despite its generic wording, the formula suggested in Tadic—which has since
been reaffirmed in international9 and national10 jurisprudence and has come to be
regarded as expressing customary international law—plainly refers to criteria specific to international (“between States”) and non-international (“between governmental authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups within a
State”) armed conflicts. The emphasis of the formula is also on the territorial extent of the armed conflict; with the exception of the single term “protracted armed
violence,” there is no reference to other factors affecting the determination of the
existence of a conflict, such as intensity, escalation, etc. However, the requirement
of a degree of organization on the parts of the actors in a conflict—whether as
States in international armed conflicts or “governmental authorities and organized
armed groups” in non-international conflicts—is made clear, and this has been reaffirmed in subsequent case law as the “first element” of the Tadic test.11 The “second element” of the test, which has been developed by subsequent jurisprudence,12
relates to the intensity of the conflict and includes such indicia as the protracted
nature of the fighting and seriousness or increase in armed clashes,13 spread of
clashes over the territory,14 increase in the number of governmental forces deployed to deal with the violence15 and the type of weaponry used by both parties to
the conflict.16 If a situation does not satisfy these customary law criteria for the existence of an armed conflict, then, however unpleasant it may be and notwithstanding the deployment of armed forces to assist in the maintenance of law and order, it
will not qualify as an armed conflict under international law; instead, it will fall into
the looser category of “banditry, criminal activity, riots, or sporadic outbreaks of
violence and acts of terrorism,”17 which are normally dealt with under national
criminal law but to which the LOAC does not apply.
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International Armed Conflicts
Once it is accepted that an armed conflict within the meaning of IHL is taking place,
it is necessary to determine what type of armed conflict it is, so that the applicable
rules of IHL can be identified. Classically the main type of armed conflict—indeed,
the only type of armed conflict regulated by international law until 1949—was one
which took place between two or more States: international armed conflict. This
was never comprehensively defined by the LOAC prior to the adoption of the
Geneva Conventions,18 since (a) it was obvious to one and all when two States were
at war with each other, a condition which usually—though not invariably—resulted from mutual declarations of war; and (b) in the absence of any other type of
war regulated by international law, an international legal definition of international conflicts was never thought necessary. Even at the time of the adoption of the
Geneva Conventions in 1949, it was still fondly believed that the main frame of reference for armed conflicts in the modern world would continue to be international
conflicts; hence the Conventions’ strong bias in favor of their detailed regulation.
The traditional certainty surrounding the scope and ambit of international
armed conflicts is reflected in the fact that, to this day, the definition of such conflicts is essentially the scope of application provisions of the Geneva Conventions
and their first Additional Protocol. Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions
provides that they “shall apply to all cases of declared war or of any other armed
conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting Parties,
even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them.” The scope of application
of the Conventions under Common Article 2 expressly includes situations of belligerent occupation of territory, whether violently opposed or not, which is significant for the situation in Iraq during the period of the CPA in 2003–4. Since only
States can be high contracting parties to the Geneva Conventions,19 the interpretation of the scope of application is clear enough. Additional Protocol I of 1977, however, added to the definition of an international armed conflict by extending its
scope to cover “armed conflicts in which people are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of their right
of self-determination.”20 Although this would seem to be a very substantial widening of the definition of international armed conflicts, it is additionally necessary for an authority representing a “people” engaged in a conflict of the kind
referred to, to make a unilateral declaration undertaking to apply the Protocol and
the Conventions in its struggle.21 To date, no such unilateral declarations have
been successfully registered, and certain States have entered reservations to the
Protocol asserting their right not to accept any such declaration unless the State is
satisfied that the authority genuinely represents the “people” concerned.22 In relation to these provisions of Protocol I, the United Kingdom entered a statement on
102
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ratification to the effect that “the term ‘armed conflict’ of itself and in its context
denotes a situation of a kind which is not constituted by the commission of ordinary crimes including acts of terrorism whether concerted or in isolation.”23 Although made specifically in relation to Articles 1(4) and 96(3) of Protocol I, the
point is of equal relevance to Article 1(2) of Protocol II.
In the event that an international armed conflict is taking place, States participating as belligerents in such a conflict will be bound by the entire corpus of customary international humanitarian law24 (including the Hague Regulations of
1907) and the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, along with any specifically applicable treaties regulating the use of weaponry. States that are also parties to the 1977
Additional Protocol I will be bound by that instrument also; even certain States
that have not accepted the Protocol as a whole accept that substantial parts of it reflect customary international law and apply its terms as such.25
Non-international Armed Conflicts
The other main type of conflict recognized in international law, at least since 1949,
is that of non-international armed conflict. In that year, Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions introduced, for the first time, legal regulation of the protection of victims in “armed conflict[s] not of an international character occurring in
the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties.” Beyond the phrase “armed
conflict not of an international character,” the article does not explain its scope of
application. The authoritative ICRC Commentary provides a list of “convenient
criteria” to assist in the differentiation of an “armed conflict not of an international
character” from “any act committed by force of arms [not amounting to armed
conflict]—any form of anarchy, rebellion, or even plain banditry”:
(1) That the Party in revolt against the de jure Government possesses an organized
military force, an authority responsible for its acts, acting within a determinate
territory and having the means of respecting and ensuring respect for the
Convention.
(2) That the legal Government is obliged to have recourse to the regular military
forces against insurgents organized as military and in possession of a part of the
national territory.
(3) (a) That the de jure Government has recognized the insurgents as belligerents; or
(b) that it has claimed for itself the rights of a belligerent; or
(c) that it has accorded the insurgents recognition as belligerents for the
purposes only of the present Convention; or
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(d) that the dispute has been admitted to the agenda of the Security Council or
the General Assembly of the United Nations as being a threat to international
peace, a breach of the peace, or an act of aggression.
(4) (a) That the insurgents have an organisation purporting to have the
characteristics of a State.
(b) That the insurgent civil authority exercises de facto authority over persons
within a determinate territory.
(c) That the armed forces act under the direction of the organized civil authority
and are prepared to observe the ordinary laws of war.
(d) That the insurgent civil authority agrees to be bound by the provisions of the
Convention.26

These indicia are both non-exhaustive and non-mandatory, thereby supporting
the ICRC’s desire that Common Article 3 should be applied “as widely as possible.”27 Arguably the logical ne plus ultra of this approach was achieved in 2006,
when a plurality of the US Supreme Court held that the “Global War on Terror”
being prosecuted in various locations around the world by the Bush administration after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 was an “armed conflict not of
an international character” to which Common Article 3 applied because the conflict was not directed against any other State.28 Minimalist and very general though
its protections are, Common Article 3 has indeed come to be accepted, as the International Court of Justice (ICJ) stated in the 1980s, as “a minimum yardstick” of
humanitarian protection in all armed conflicts, whatever their characterization.29
The very minimalism of Common Article 3 and its perceived ineffectiveness in
protecting the victims of non-international armed conflicts led to the adoption of
a second Additional Protocol in 1977, which is exclusively concerned with the regulation of such conflicts. At the opposite extreme from Common Article 3’s allencompassing scope of application, however, Protocol II was given a scope of application so restricted as to render it all but unworkable in practice. Article 1(1) of
Protocol II states that the Protocol applies to
all armed conflicts which are not covered by [the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocol I] and which take place in the territory of a High Contracting Party between
its armed forces and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups which,
under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its territory as to
enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to
implement this Protocol.
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Article 1(2) goes on to specify that the Protocol does not apply to “situations of
internal disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature, as not being armed conflicts.” In practice,
this is the real fault line when considering the spectrum of conflict for the purposes
of the scope of application of IHL: once a situation in a State escalates beyond
“internal disturbances and tensions,” it will be considered (absent the involvement of any other State) to be a non-international armed conflict. Whether it is
such a conflict within the terms of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions
or Article 1(1) of Additional Protocol II will then be a question of degree depending on the facts on the ground.
If an armed conflict is deemed non-international in nature, the question remains
as to what provisions of the LOAC would have to be applied in such a conflict apart
from the basic rules in Common Article 3 and, if applicable, Additional Protocol II.
In particular, these treaty law provisions applicable in NIAC are considerably less
detailed and developed than those that are applicable in IAC and they focus overwhelmingly on the protection of victims, while saying nothing at all about the
methods and means of warfare. It is true, however, that some of the other treaties
that comprise the LOAC, including treaties regulating the use of specific weapons,
have been extended to cover situations of NIAC30 or, indeed, apply in all circumstances and therefore in all types of armed conflict.31 In its seminal decision in
Tadic, the ICTY Appeals Chamber confirmed the generalities of this trend in customary international law, stating that
elementary considerations of humanity and common sense make it preposterous that
the use by States of weapons prohibited in armed conflicts between themselves be
allowed when States try to put down rebellion by their own nationals on their own
territory. What is inhumane, and consequently proscribed, in international wars,
cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife.32

Although the ICTY’s comments in Tadic in respect to this trend were rather too
general to clarify much of the lex lata with regard to the regulation of methods and
means of warfare in NIAC,33 the ICRC’s study, Customary International Humanitarian Law, published in 2005, extends most of its 161 identified rules to NIAC;34
however, its methodology and the evidence supporting its approach have not been
free from criticism.35
“Other” Armed Conflicts
Although the essential dichotomy of international versus non-international armed
conflicts remains securely in place as regards the basic typologies of armed conflict
105
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explicitly recognized in international humanitarian law, it represents what might
be termed a very classical approach to the nature of war. As the history of modern
warfare reveals, the last two decades of the twentieth century and the first decade of
the twenty-first century have seen the increasing prevalence of—if not exactly new
types of conflict—new methodologies of conflict.36 These may be referred to by a variety of terms indicating their unorthodox nature according to traditional military
thinking: the most widely used such terms are “asymmetrical,” “low-intensity,”
“hybrid” and “unconventional” conflicts. These notions, along with the concepts
of counterinsurgency and stability operations, belong to the realms of military and
strategic doctrine, not to that of international law. In the contemporary legal
discourse their counterparts are the potentially confusing and ambiguous terms
“internationalized” and “transnational” conflicts. Like all armed conflicts, these
must be subject to the LOAC, but because the Geneva Conventions and Additional
Protocols do not prima facie take account of them in their scope of application provisions, the question has arisen with increasing urgency: for the purposes of determining the applicability of IHL, what types of conflict are these under the law, and
which provisions of the LOAC apply to them?37 What comparatively little legal
authority there is on point derives from either decided case law or scholarly
commentary.
The concept of internationalized armed conflict first arose in the jurisprudence
of the ICTY as a result of the 1992–95 Bosnian war, which was essentially a conflict
internal to Bosnia and Herzegovina, but in which forces of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia and the Republic of Croatia intervened. An internationalized conflict
has been held to be one that is prima facie internal, but has been rendered
international in nature if
1. it exceeds the boundaries of the State within which it was initially taking
place;38 or
2. another State intervenes directly in the conflict with its own forces,
particularly if in doing so it occupies territory within the meaning of
Article 42 of the Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention IV;39 or
3. another State intervenes indirectly in the conflict by virtue of some of the
participants in the internal conflict acting on behalf of that other State.40
The third of these possibilities has been the most problematic in practice, but current international jurisprudence confirms that the correct test for determining the
internationalization of an internal conflict by the indirect intervention of a foreign
106
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State is a test of “overall control” under the doctrine of State responsibility in general public international law, whereby
it is by no means necessary that the controlling authorities should plan all the
operations of the units dependent on them, choose their targets, or give specific
instructions concerning the conduct of military operations and any alleged violations
of international humanitarian law. The control required by international law may be
deemed to exist when a State (or, in the context of an armed conflict, the Party to the
conflict) has a role in organizing, coordinating or planning the military actions of the
military group, in addition to financing, training and equipping or providing
operational support to that group. Acts performed by the group or members thereof
may be regarded as acts of de facto State organs regardless of any specific instruction by
the controlling State concerning the commission of each of those acts.41

Once it has been determined that a particular armed conflict has been internationalized, the entire range of the LOAC applicable in international armed conflicts comes into play because the status of the conflict effectively becomes just that:
an internationalized internal armed conflict becomes neither less nor more than an
international armed conflict. The entire corpus of the customary law of IAC, together with the Hague Regulations, Geneva Conventions, and any other treaties
that the relevant State has ratified, will then govern the conduct of its armed forces.
The term “transnational conflict,” as has been suggested by some commentators,
“represents an evolution of the law, more properly characterized as lex ferenda than
lex lata.”42 It has been used in the contemporary international security context to
refer principally to the US conflict against Al-Qaeda since September 2001 as a
conflict that technically satisfies the scope of application requirements of neither
IAC nor NIAC but undeniably involves military combat operations and displays
features of both types of conflict—namely, the extraterritorial location of the fighting coupled with the absence of a State-actor adversary. A concept of such conflicts
as a new typology of armed conflict has been “in the air” since the displacement of
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan in December 2001. The end of belligerent occupation in Iraq in June 2004 transformed both those conflicts—which continued
unabated and, indeed, even intensified—from ones that had been clearly international in nature into something else.
The premise of the theory is that an armed conflict that is not IAC is governed,
in default, by Common Article 3; but the latter is deficient inasmuch as it only provides for the general protection of victims, while saying nothing at all about the
methods and means of warfare and the conduct of hostilities. In itself, this is not a
new point: it has been made before, by the present author among others.43 Corn
and Jensen suggest that
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while the term “transnational” armed conflict . . . may be new, the substantive impact
of this concept is . . . a very old paradigm—that armed forces carry norms of conduct
with them during all combat operations. In other words, a State cannot invoke the
authorities of armed conflict and not concurrently accept the obligations. Accordingly,
the use of the term “transnational” is really just semantic; what . . . is significant is that
armed conflict must be understood as triggering the normative framework of the
LOAC. And that is a proposition that . . . is really as old as organized warfare itself.44

As such, the suggested concept of transnational armed conflicts is a functional
one that finds no direct support in the letter of the law, but rather in its spirit. It
proposes that once the “trigger” of armed conflict—any armed conflict—has been
generated, in respect to conflicts that are neither clearly IAC nor NIAC, such as the
conflict with Al-Qaeda,45 then “fundamental principles” of the LOAC apply. Such
principles may be derived from customary international law, as evidenced by State
practice. For example, one oft-cited current military manual lists “military necessity,
humanity, distinction, and proportionality.”46 Corn and Jensen refer to “targeting
principles” as part of their suggested “fundamental principles of the LOAC,”47 a
suggestion which subsumes distinction and proportionality and is certainly supported by some State practice.48 By logical extension most of the customary international humanitarian law rules identified by the ICRC would also be applicable in
transnational armed conflicts since its study explicitly specifies in most cases that
they apply in both international and non-international armed conflicts;49 the proof
of this, however, would have to be conclusively determined by future State
practice.
Application of the Typology of Armed Conflicts to Iraq since 2003
The Initial Invasion Phase
The conflict in Iraq, in its first or main invasion phase, commenced with an unsuccessful attempt to “decapitate” the Ba’athist regime by killing President Saddam
Hussein on March 19, 2003; waves of airstrikes by British and American aircraft
then went in on March 20, followed by a ground invasion conducted by coalition
forces contributed by the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland,
subsequently supported also by Spain, Denmark and a number of other countries.
Saddam’s regime was effectively removed from power as US forces progressively
penetrated Baghdad during the first week of April, leading to the city’s complete
occupation and the end of organized resistance by regular Iraqi government forces
on April 9. Large-scale looting and communal violence then erupted, however, and
fighting with irregular armed elements did not cease. On May 1, 2003, US President George W. Bush formally declared an end to major combat operations.50
108
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The period from March 19 to April 30, 2003 “clearly constituted an international armed conflict between the coalition States and Iraq.”51 Shortly before the
start of invasion, the ICRC sent a “Memorandum on the Rules of International
Humanitarian Law to Be Respected by the States Involved in Military Hostilities”
to the anticipated belligerents, in which it emphasized the need to respect the detailed provisions of the four Geneva Conventions.52 Iraq, the United States, the
United Kingdom and Australia were all at the material time party to the Geneva
Conventions; the latter two States were also party to Additional Protocol I and
therefore were equally bound by that instrument’s provisions. Although the
United States was not technically so bound, certain provisions of the Protocol
which the United States believes reflect customary international law were applied
by US forces as a matter of policy.53 Finally, all belligerents were bound by the entire corpus of customary international humanitarian law, including notably the
Hague Regulations of 1907 (to which Iraq, for example, was not a party).54
The Belligerent Occupation Phase
The technical details of the law of belligerent occupation are considered elsewhere
in this volume,55 but at the outset of this section the main point to note is that belligerent occupation of territory is considered to be effectively an extension of international armed conflict for the purposes of IHL because it is generally the territory
of another State that is being occupied consequent upon an armed conflict with
that other State. Occupation is governed specifically by 1949 Geneva Convention
IV, relative to the protection of civilian persons, and by certain provisions of the
Hague Regulations. Although there is some doctrinal controversy as to the precise
moment during hostilities when an occupation legally begins,56 the application of
Geneva Convention IV ceases one year after the general close of military operations57 (which in the case of Iraq would suggest an end date of April 30, 2004 if
President Bush’s announcement of the end of major combat operations58 is to be
taken at face value). The CPA was in fact established to represent the occupying
powers’ administration of Iraq on May 16, 2003,59 ten days after President Bush
had appointed Ambassador L. Paul Bremer III to head the Authority60 and more
than two weeks after the announcement of the end of major combat operations. A
transfer of power from the CPA to a transitional Iraqi administration took place on
June 28, 2004,61 at which point the MNF-I had already been established and the law
of belligerent occupation technically ceased to be formally applicable in Iraq.
After some initial reluctance to use the international law terminology of belligerent occupation,62 the United States and United Kingdom recognized themselves as occupiers when they voted in favor of Security Council Resolution 1483
on May 22, 2003.63 The Resolution refers to the United States and United Kingdom
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as “occupying powers” in its preamble64 and also refers expressly, in its substantive paragraph 5, to obligations relating to belligerent occupation arising under
the Hague Regulations and Geneva Convention IV. Even had the United States
and United Kingdom formally declined to recognize themselves as occupying
powers, the Geneva Convention would have been applicable automatically as the
United States, United Kingdom and Iraq are all high contracting parties and the
Convention specifies its scope of application as extending to
all cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or
more of the High Contracting Parties . . . [and] . . . all cases of partial or total occupation
of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the said occupation meets with no
armed resistance.65

The Hague Regulations contain no such statement concerning their scope of
application, but Article 42 states that “[t]erritory is considered occupied when it is
actually placed under the authority of the hostile army.” In his briefing to the Security Council on May 22, 2003 regarding the provision of humanitarian assistance in
Iraq, Jakob Kellenberger, the President of the International Committee of the Red
Cross, noted:
As far as the legal framework is concerned, we are, in terms of humanitarian law . . . in a
situation of occupation. The applicability of the relevant provisions of the Geneva
Conventions, in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention, and of the Hague
Regulation is accepted by the occupying Power [sic].66

However—at least as far as the United Kingdom is concerned—significant developments in the UK domestic courts following reported abuses of Iraqi civilians by
British troops have resulted in a major expansion of human rights law. These
courts have held that where British troops have physical custody of local civilians in
certain circumstances during an occupation, the latter’s rights are protected not
only by the law of armed conflict but also by the UK Human Rights Act 1998 (implementing the 1950 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms into domestic law in the United Kingdom).67
The Post-occupation Phase
The phase of operations in Iraq which followed the termination of the CPA occupation regime in June 2004, and which has persisted, with varying degrees of intensity, to the present time, is usually characterized simply as an “insurgency” in lay
language; but in terms of the scope of application of the LOAC, it is by far the most
difficult to pin down. The insurgent forces have comprised a mixture of renegade
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Ba’athist supporters of the late Saddam regime, Iraqi nationalists, Sunni Islamists,
Shi’a Islamists, diverse foreign fighters and alleged Al-Qaeda operatives, who between them constitute at least a dozen major organizations and probably several
dozen discrete smaller groups. Many of these groups have fought against the coalition, while others have fought against each other for local control. The hostilities
have been at varying stages of intensity, from set-piece urban operations like the
battles of Fallujah and Najaf in 2004 to isolated individual shootings and bomb attacks on coalition troops. The coalition forces officially became the MNF-I in June
200468 when the UN Security Council passed Resolution 1546.69 Eventually a total
of thirty-seven States (excluding the United States, United Kingdom and Australia,
the original members of the coalition at the time of the invasion) contributed military forces to the MNF-I under the Security Council mandate. All of these other
States progressively withdrew their forces from Iraq until July 2009, when the
United Kingdom and Australia also withdrew. The Security Council mandate expired in December 2008, leaving the remaining foreign forces present in Iraq with
the permission of the Iraqi government but without an international mandate. US
forces have since been re-designated United States Forces–Iraq, effective January
2010, and their presence in Iraq is now governed by the security agreement, under
which their complete withdrawal from Iraqi territory is provisionally required by
December 2011.70
It is easy enough to provide a factual description of counterinsurgency operations—which are evidently what coalition forces were engaged in from 2004 onward—but how do they fit into the typology of armed conflicts under IHL, and
(crucially) what law is applicable in such military operations? In the specific case of
Iraq, the complications arose from the following factors:

• the fact that the occupation was officially no longer in place but coalition
troops remained in Iraq, undertaking military operations under Security Council
authority and with the permission of a government those forces had themselves
installed;
• the fact that coalition States had deployed forces to undertake military
operations in a foreign State and against foreign nationals; and

• the fact that any armed conflict was no longer directed against any other
State.
These salient features gave rise to the fundamental question of how to characterize the situation in Iraq, for IHL purposes, after the end of occupation in June 2004.
Was it an international armed conflict, a non-international armed conflict or
something else? The question would not have arisen but for the Iraq situation’s

111

Vol 86.ps
C:\_WIP\_Blue Book\_Vol 86\_Ventura\Vol 86.vp
Monday, May 24, 2010 11:46:37 AM

Color profile: Disabled
Composite Default screen

International Humanitarian Law Classification of Armed Conflicts in Iraq
failure to fit neatly into any of the categories of armed conflict that are recognized
in IHL:

• once the state of occupation officially ended, the detailed technical
provisions of the law of belligerent occupation were no longer applicable;
• the situation did not constitute an international armed conflict on a plain
reading of the Geneva Conventions, since (from the point of view of the MNF-I) it
was not directed against any other State and, indeed, the MNF-I was present on
the territory with host-State consent;
• neither of the 1977 Additional Protocols could have been formally
applicable as neither Iraq nor the United States (as the main contributor to and
leader of the MNF-I) was a party to either instrument—although they could have
been applicable to British and Australian forces; and
• the situation logically could not have been said to be “not of an international
character,” since both semantically and logically there is nothing non-international
about the use of troops to fight against foreign nationals abroad.
The consequent difficulty would be the lack of any readily apparent legal framework within which the military operations of the MNF-I could be situated. As one
highly respected commentator neatly put it more than two decades before the conflict in Iraq:
A . . . relationship, between the insurgents and a foreign state that has been invited by
the established government to help it overcome the rebellion, gives rise to great
difficulties in determining what law is applicable. The traditional answer, which makes
the situation subject to the rules of non-international armed conflict, clashes with the
undeniably international character of this type of relationship.71

The “received opinion” concerning the nature of the conflict in Iraq after the
end of the occupation phase has been that the conflict ceased to be international,
and became non-international, in nature. This was the consistent and unambiguous position of the ICRC,72 as noted by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.73
The British government for years after 2004 assiduously resisted making any public
statement as to the classification of the conflict in Iraq; instead, it kept repeating the
mantra that British forces were present in Iraq as part of MNF-I with the consent of
the Iraqi government and under a mandate from the UN Security Council. This
unsatisfactory obfuscation—it purported to answer a jus in bello question with a jus
ad bellum rejoinder and placed undue emphasis on strictly political factors, as discussed below—ceased to be necessary when the British government conceded, in
the course of litigation about an asylum applicant’s entitlement to humanitarian
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protection, that “Iraq as a whole is in a state of internal armed conflict for the purposes of IHL and [the government of Iraq] is one of the parties to the conflict.”74
This position is broadly consistent with the approach adopted by a plurality of
the US Supreme Court in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,75 in which it was suggested that the
conflict between the United States and Al-Qaeda should be treated as an “armed
conflict not of an international character” within the terms of Common Article 3 of
the Geneva Conventions. It should be noted, however, that this finding was not an
essential part of the decision (i.e., it was an obiter dictum), and was concerned with
the relevance of IHL exclusively for the relatively narrow purpose of ascertaining
the correct standard of treatment for detainees held in Guantánamo Bay and
whether the military commissions created to try them were lawfully established.
The interest of the scope of application question in Iraq, on the other hand, is not
confined to the legality of a particular type of domestic tribunal established for the
trial of criminal offenses. The view that the Iraqi conflict after the end of occupation became non-international in nature is based, legally, on a literalist reading of
Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions and, strictly speaking, is technically
correct on the law as far as the application of the Conventions is concerned. The
main difficulty with the British government’s approach, in fact, is that it gives
undue prominence to aspects that are entirely political in nature, namely the fact
of an “invitation” from the new Iraqi government at the end of the occupation
phase and the executive mandate from the Security Council (of which the United
States and the United Kingdom are conveniently permanent members). It also, in
this author’s submission, takes an unduly restrictive and minimalist approach to
IHL, which is fundamentally inappropriate in light of the law’s humanitarian aims
and objectives.
As regards the former point, the authority of the Security Council is clearly open
to abuse if certain permanent members who are the prime movers behind a decision then claim that such authority trumps all objections. The legal counterpart of
this approach was given judicial expression in the United Kingdom by the House of
Lords when, in a legal challenge to the detention without charge of a civilian by
British forces in Iraq since October 2004, it was held that the Security Council’s
authority for the MNF-I to maintain law, order and security in Iraq by (inter alia)
“internment where this is necessary for imperative reasons of security,”76 trumped
any inconsistent provisions of IHL or human rights law by virtue of Articles 25 and
103 of the UN Charter.77 At the very least, such a position is politically self-serving,
given that the United Kingdom (along with the United States) was the principal instigator of Resolution 1546. As to the “invitation,” no allowance is made either for
the fact that the government doing the inviting was installed by those same States
(which is again a politically self-serving position) or for the linked fact that that
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government may not have been truly empowered to issue such an invitation to foreign forces because it lacked either domestic or international legitimacy. For example, during the Hungarian, Czechoslovak and Afghan crises of 1956, 1968 and
1979, respectively, the Soviet Union in each case claimed to have been invited to intervene militarily; however, it was far from clear that the “governments” which had
issued those invitations were legitimately installed in power and legally competent
to issue them. Although the position of the interim Iraqi government in 2004 was
different to some extent, in that it was installed with the imprimatur of the Security
Council (albeit without a democratic mandate), does that necessarily make the coalition action any more legitimate than that of the USSR in the earlier instances?
Arguably it does not, since the change of regime was effected as a result of a foreign
armed intervention of dubious legality under international law, something as true
in the case of Iraq as in the cases of Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan. It
was inevitable that the Iraqi government in 2004 would “consent” to the continuing presence and actions of the MNF-I on its territory, since it was in essence the
MNF-I that put the government in place. In these circumstances, the issue of hostState consent is arguably meaningless.
The characterization of the situation in Iraq post-2004 as a non-international
armed conflict is not inaccurate on a literalist interpretation of Common Article 2
of the Geneva Conventions, and is arguably supported by the US Supreme Court’s
decision in Hamdan. Neither Iraq nor the United States is a party to Additional
Protocol II and the United Kingdom (which is a party to that instrument) has
never conceded that the Iraqi insurgents satisfy its scope of application under Article 1(1), so the only clearly applicable IHL—if this characterization of the situation
is accepted—would be Common Article 3 and customary international humanitarian law. Common Articles 2 and 3 are, of course, concerned exclusively with the
scope of application of the Geneva Conventions—and there is more to IHL than
just those Conventions. There is the large corpus of customary international humanitarian law, much of which is now believed to be of general applicability in all
armed conflicts.78 Which precise rules of that body of law would be applicable
would depend on the extent to which the coalition States agree with the ICRC
study’s conclusions as to what are the rules.79
It should also be noted that the jurisprudence of the ICTY has extensively discussed the possibility of a non-international armed conflict becoming internationalized through the participation of another State in the (otherwise internal)
hostilities.80 In such cases, the normal range of IAC law becomes applicable to the
conflict, as in any “normal” international armed conflict. Although prima facie this
might be of direct relevance to the situation in Iraq, actually it is of somewhat limited utility, since the cases all concerned instances of intervention by foreign States
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(principally the Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in the
Bosnian conflict) on the side of the insurgents, rather than that of the government.
In that situation, it is clear that the conflict effectively became one between “two or
more of the High Contracting Parties” to the Geneva Conventions, within the
terms of Common Article 2 thereof. In Iraq, on the other hand, the foreign States
were fighting on the side of the government rather than that of the insurgents. Only
if another State—Iran, for example—had openly intervened on the side of any insurgent groups in Iraq to the extent that it could be said to have overall control over
them would the conflict vis-à-vis such groups have become internationalized
within the terms of the ICTY jurisprudence.
There is a viable alternative approach to the characterization of the situation in
Iraq post-occupation as non-international armed conflict, and that is to treat it—
at least on a de facto basis—as international in nature. One rationale for this approach, made elsewhere in this volume,81 is the argument that the conflict retains
its original characterization throughout its duration, and that a government installed in Iraq as a result of the invasion cannot “magically” convert the conflict
from an international to a non-international one by purporting to “invite” the coalition forces to be present in the territory which they had already invaded and occupied as a hostile act. It has further been asserted as a matter of doctrine that “a
government established by the occupying power cannot in law give its agreement
to the presence of the occupying troops in its territory and thereby transmute occupation by the armed forces of an outside state into the friendly presence of [the
same] state.”82 Although this author is greatly in sympathy with these views, as far
as the scope of application provisions of the Geneva Conventions are concerned,
they appear to be contradicted by a plain reading of Common Article 2, as discussed above.
On the other hand, the US Secretary of State in 2004 seemed at least implicitly to
consider that coalition forces in Iraq after the occupation would continue to apply
the law of international armed conflict when he wrote that “the forces that make up
the MNF are and will remain committed at all times to act consistently with their
obligations under the law of armed conflict, including the Geneva Conventions.”83
Why would the last phrase be expressed in the plural if it were not intended that the
obligations of IAC law were to be applied, thereby arguably implying a presumption that the conflict in Iraq continued to be international in nature?
A less dogmatic and semantic approach is to be found in the reasoning of the Supreme Court of Israel in Public Committee against Torture in Israel v. Government of
Israel,84 where the Court held that the conflict between Israel and non-State actors in
the Palestinian Territories should be treated as international in nature, partly because of their transnational nature as evidenced by the deployment of Israeli forces
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outside the borders of the State of Israel, and partly because of the advanced military capabilities of many contemporary non-State armed organizations, which
mean that the scale and intensity of the hostilities effectively rise to the level of an
international armed conflict. The former proposition, in particular, has received
some support in the literature since.85
Finally, a case—arguably the most powerful case—for the de facto internationalization of the conflict against Iraqi insurgents could also be made based on a teleological interpretation of IHL in light of its aims and purposes. In relation to
international armed conflicts, the LOAC is much more detailed and developed, with
a far higher degree of internationally recognized regulation of both the conduct of
hostilities and the protection of victims, than in relation to non-international armed
conflicts. To put it crudely, there is more law in relation to international armed
conflicts; this implies not only more precise protection for “victims,” but also a
more regulated approach to the actions of soldiers on the ground, with greater consequent protections for them in the event of any accusations of wrongdoing. Writing a dozen years ago, one of America’s most respected experts on IHL stated that
“[i]n interpreting the law, our goal should be to avoid paralyzing the legal process
as much as possible and, in the case of humanitarian conventions, to enable them
to serve their protective goals.”86 In relation to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the interest of the State in having the conflict considered as international in
nature was summarized as follows:
[T]he Soviet Union’s interests would impel it to apply the whole of international
humanitarian law to the conflict [in Afghanistan]. The Soviet Union would be
especially concerned with having its troops benefit from the greatest possible measure
of protection. The law on non-international armed conflicts does not provide any
special status for the combatants, even when captured. Only the law that is applicable
to international conflicts, specifically the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, protects
the combatant and guarantees him favored status as a prisoner of war. Thus, the Soviet
Union should seek to have international [armed conflict] law applied if the Soviet
authorities are concerned with the fate of their soldiers who fall into the insurgent’s
[sic] hands. Considerations of this kind might tempt an intervening power to opt for
the extensive protection of the rules governing international armed conflicts, even if
this would require that power to abide by the same rules.87

The fundamental reason for the insistence on characterizing the conflict in Iraq
post-occupation as non-international, of course, is the unwillingness of coalition
States to put themselves in a position where they would have to apply the rules of
Geneva Convention III to captured insurgents by according them the status of
POWs. This is partly because of the long-held view that to accord such status would
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confer on the insurgents a legitimacy to which they should not strictly speaking be
entitled, and partly because of all the other technical provisions concerning POWs
that would then also have to be applied, with certain negative implications for the
coalition States.88 There is also the undeniable fact that the notion of reciprocity in
observing the law, relied upon by Gasser, simply does not obtain in Iraq: the insurgents have consistently shown no regard whatsoever for the observance of IHL
rules in their fight against foreign forces. Indeed, the same author’s statement of
the insurgents’ interest in having the conflict considered international clearly demonstrates a compelling reason for not considering it as such:
The intervention of an outside state would provide [insurgents] with proof of the
international nature of the struggle. The insurgents would argue that the intervention
of foreign armed forces alongside government troops makes the conflict an
international one. The insurgents would have an interest in capturing members of the
[foreign] armed forces, calling them “prisoners of war,” and demanding that the
adversaries adhere to the same rules.89

The insurgents in Iraq would do no such thing. Moreover, their struggle would
be to some extent “legitimated” in the eyes of the international community—at
least in terms of the application of IHL—and that is precisely the effect the multinational forces (and, latterly, the US forces) in Iraq seek to avoid.
Conclusions
The classification of armed conflicts in Iraq during and after the second Gulf War
in 2003 presents certain specific problems. The initial invasion phase, in March
and April 2003, and the belligerent occupation phase, from May 2003 to June 2004,
are uncontroversial in that they clearly constituted an international armed conflict
under the scope of application provisions of the Geneva Conventions. The international law applicable in those phases consisted of the corpus of customary international humanitarian law, specifically including the Hague Regulations, plus the
Geneva Conventions. As far as the United Kingdom and Australia—but not the
United States and Iraq—were concerned, Additional Protocol I would have been
applicable too. During the occupation phase, only certain specific provisions of the
Hague Regulations, plus Geneva Convention IV, applied as the lex specialis of occupation. After the end of occupation in June 2004, the position became substantially less clear.
Although the United States refrained from conclusively classifying the conflict
and the United Kingdom considered it to be non-international in nature because of
the absence of a State adversary, decided case law and academic commentary are more
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ambivalent. If the option of creating a “new” typology of armed conflicts, which
might be known variously as “transnational” or “mixed” conflicts, is dismissed, we
are left with the standard two possibilities: international or non-international armed
conflict. While the latter is supported by the practice of certain coalition States—
principally the United Kingdom—it is a policy determination based on expediency, rather than a legal classification based on a proper analysis of the facts and the
law. As such it is undesirable. This author takes the view that the conflict would
have been better treated as a de facto international armed conflict, notwithstanding
its failure to comply strictly with the wording of Common Article 2 of the Geneva
Conventions. This would not necessarily have required slavish adherence to every
dot and comma of every article of the Conventions: coalition forces could have
announced that they would treat captured insurgents as POWs, without actually
according them such formal status. In light of the detainee abuse scandals at Abu
Ghraib, Camp Breadbasket and other such places of ill repute, public adherence to
the higher legal standards derived from the law of international armed conflict
would have sent a powerful, and positive, message to the world about the coalition’s values and behavior. The IAC law of targeting was applied in any event, so no
change in practice would have been required there. The policy reasons for adopting
this approach were at least as compelling, in this author’s view, as the policy reasons against. Nevertheless, it is recognized that governments are often likely to take
the easier option. Applying the law of non-international armed conflict—which in
Iraq basically meant just Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions since
neither the United States nor Iraq is a party to Additional Protocol II—means
much less law to worry about, especially in relation to detainees.
However, the emergence of human rights law as a body of regulation applicable
(at least for certain States) in certain post-conflict situations analogous to occupations means that the advocates of increased humanitarian protection and oversight
of military forces’ behavior may yet have the last laugh over those who would prefer
unfettered executive discretion. As Gasser has written:
[I]t would be wishful thinking to postulate the application of the whole body of
international humanitarian law to the relations between the intervening power and the
insurgents. Nevertheless, humanitarian policy demands that some agreement be made
to give better protection for all actual and potential victims of the conflict. Among the
top priorities must be achieving greater respect for the civilian population, treating
captured combatants similarly to prisoners of war, and guaranteeing respect for the
protective emblem.90
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